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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978, Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), which was
1
intended to prevent wholesale removal of Indian children from their families
2
after years of abusive assimilation policies. The American historical narrative is
replete with examples of forced removal of Indian children by social, political,
and religious organizations for the sole purpose of westernizing and civilizing
3
Indian tribes and children. ICWA, however, was not without its critics, and
courts have struggled in implementing the legislation that likely exceeds
4
Congress' enumerated powers. In trying to limit the application of ICWA to
5
those cases that implicated the break-up of Indian families, courts adopted the
6
“Existing Indian Family” Exception (EIFE). Indian advocacy groups have
criticized the EIFE, a judicially created bar to parts or all of ICWA, and courts
7
throughout most of the country use the EIFE infrequently. However, the decision
8
in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, only the second case by the Supreme Court to
address ICWA, appears to finally signal the highest Court’s endorsement of the
9
EIFE.
This Comment will argue, despite claims to the contrary, that the Supreme
Court endorsed a limited application of the “existing Indian family” exception in

1. This Comment uses the word “Indian,” rather than the preferred term “Native American.” The purpose
for this is to avoid mixed nomenclature as the term “Indian” is used exclusively in the Indian Child Welfare Act
as well as in Constitutional Jurisprudence. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
2. Infra Part II.A.
3. See, e.g., Charla Bear, American Indian Boarding Schools Haunt Many, NPR, (May 12, 2008, 12:01
AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16516865 (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (detailing the experiences of children placed in boarding schools, sometimes forcibly, to meet quotas).
4. Infra Part III.
5. Infra Part II.D
6. Infra Part II.D.1.
7. Infra Part II.D.2.
8. In Adoptive Couple, the Supreme Court held that the Indian Child Welfare Act should not apply to
Indian children who are voluntarily placed for adoption by a custodial parent, despite objections by a noncustodial, Indian parent. 133 S.Ct. 2552 (2013).
9. Infra Part IV.
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the recent ruling of Adoptive Couple, signaling to lower courts that the EIFE
should apply in cases that implicate a violation of Indian children’s equal
protection rights. Part II explores the historical background of ICWA, examines
the Act’s key provisions and explains the “existing Indian family” exception. Part
II also discusses the decline of the “existing Indian family” exception across
jurisdictions and state codifications of ICWA in statutory law. Part III explains
the questionable constitutionality of ICWA, and explores how the language in
Adoptive Couple illustrates these constitutional concerns and supports the need to
revitalize the “existing Indian family” exception. Part IV analyzes how the
Supreme Court has essentially given the green light to lower courts to use the
“existing Indian family” exception. Part IV also examines how the decision in
Adoptive Couple parallels the reasoning behind the “existing Indian family”
doctrine as originally articulated by the Kansas Supreme Court in Adoption of
Baby Boy L. Finally, this Comment concludes that, in light of the debatable
legality of ICWA and the recent developments from the Supreme Court, state
courts should adopt the “existing Indian family” exception.
II. BACKGROUND: WHAT IS THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AND THE
“EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY” EXCEPTION ?
This section begins by detailing the legal landscape of Indian Law
jurisprudence, the historical background of ICWA and the key provisions of the
Act. This section then discusses the “existing Indian family” exception and its
decline. Finally, this section examines the impacts of state codifications of ICWA
in statutory law.
A. History of ICWA
11

In 1978, the United States Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act as
12
a solution to decades of abusive state and federal assimilation policies that
resulted in “an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families . . . broken up by
the . . . often unwarranted . . . [removal] of [Indian] children . . . by nontribal
13
public and private agencies . . . .” One such program, considered by child
welfare advocates to be an “example of enlightened adoption practice[s],” was
14
the Indian Adoption Project (Project). The goal of the Project was to place
10. Infra Part IV.
11. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2004) [hereinafter ICWA].
12. See Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture, Jurisdiction, and the Indian
Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 585, 600 (1994) (observing that European cultural bias powered
assimilationist state policies to justify the removal of Indian children from their families).
13. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4).
14. Ellen Herman, Indian Adoption Project, ADOPTION HIST. PROJECT (Feb. 24, 2012), http://pages.
uoregon.edu/adoption/topics/IAP.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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15

Indian children in adoptive homes “across lines of nation, culture, and race.”
Administered by The Child Welfare League of America and funded by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Project placed over 395 Indian children in
16
non-Indian homes between 1958 and 1967. This program was unique at a time
during the twentieth century when the philosophy of race matching dominated
17
adoption proceedings in the United States.
18
Tribes and Indian activists roundly criticized the Project as genocidal. In
support of cultural genocide claims, members from the Association on American
Indian Affairs (AAIA) testified before the United States Senate that Indian
children in California were “removed from their homes and placed in adoptive
homes and foster homes 6.1 times (610 percent) more often than non-Indian
19
children . . . . ” The AAIA also reported high removal rates of Indian children
20
from their homes in most other states.
Acting on calls for action, Congress recognized that “there [was] no
resource . . . more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes
21
than their children . . . . ” ICWA declared that the Indian Commerce Clause
22
gave Congress “plenary power over Indian affairs,” and thus justified
23
Congressional authority to regulate state Indian child welfare proceedings.
States are free to adopt stronger protections for Indian children in such
24
proceedings, and indeed many have by codifying ICWA in their state laws;
however, minimum federal standards under ICWA will always apply to Indian
25
children, regardless of their domicile.
B. To Whom and When Does ICWA Apply?
ICWA applies to Indian children, statutorily defined as “any unmarried
person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., 549 (August 4, 1977).
20. See id. at 538 (finding, for example, that in Maine the removal rate was 19 times greater, and in South
Dakota the rate was 22 times greater than the rate of non-Indian children).
21. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (2004) (finding a high percentage of Indian child removal to non-Indian
homes).
22. Id. § 1901(1).
23. See generally id. §§ 1901–1963 (delineating federal requirements for child custody proceedings,
Indian family program requirements, and record keeping requirements).
24. See, e.g. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 224 (West 2008) (adopting federal ICWA language into state
law and refusing to acknowledge the EIFE, thus making California state law more protective of Indian
children).
25. See generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (delineating federal requirements for child custody
proceedings, Indian family program requirements, and record keeping requirements).
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(b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a
26
member of an Indian tribe.”
ICWA only applies to Indian children when they are the subject of a custody
hearing, defined as any hearing that contemplates adoptive and pre-adoptive
27
placements, foster care placements, or any termination of parental rights. The
Act specifically exempts itself from application in custody proceedings that are
28
the result of divorce or parents’ legal separation.
C. What Does ICWA Provide?
29

ICWA is unique because it serves as a procedural jurisdictional statute and
provides statutory “minimum [f]ederal standards for the removal of Indian
children from their families” and subsequent placement of the children on the
30
basis of race.
1. ICWA as a Jurisdictional Statute
Jurisdiction of child custody proceedings under ICWA can be exclusive or
31
concurrent. When an Indian child is domiciled on a tribe's reservation, and is
either a member of that tribe or eligible for membership, that tribe has
“[exclusive] jurisdiction . . . over any child custody proceeding involving [the]
32
Indian child.” When the child is domiciled off the reservation, “absence of good
cause to the contrary” or objections by either parent, the court must transfer
33
Indian child custody proceedings to tribal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has
interpreted the transfer requirement to mean that tribal courts have concurrent
34
jurisdiction over any child protected under ICWA. Additionally, “the Indian
child’s tribe … [has] a right to intervene at any point” during a defined child
35
custody proceeding.
26. Id. § 1903(4).
27. Id. § 1903(1).
28. Id.
29. See id. § 1911 (outlining when tribes have exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction over Indian child
custody proceedings).
30. Id. § 1902; see also Joanna L. Grossman, Solomon’s Child: How Baby Veronica Came to Be Returned
Home After a Long Legal Battle, FAM. L. BLOG (July 23, 2013), http://verdict.justia.com/2013/ 07/23/solomonschild (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“In adoption law, ICWA is unique in its focus on the rights
and well-being of an ethnic or racial group as a whole, rather than on the best interests of individual
children.”).
31. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a); Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989)
(holding that section 1911(b) “creates concurrent but presumptively tribal jurisdiction in the case of children not
domiciled on [a] reservation”).
32. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a).
33. Id. § 1911(b).
34. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 36.
35. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c).
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The consequences of failing to notify the Indian child’s tribe of custody
proceedings that fall under ICWA vary among jurisdictions, from invalidation of
court orders to remanding proceedings in order to determine whether failure
36
resulted in prejudice to any of the parties. ICWA provides that any custodial
parent or the child’s tribe may petition the court to invalidate any placement or
37
termination of parental rights that violate its provisions.
2. ICWA Provides Special Protections for Indian Parents and Families
Laws regulating the voluntary termination of parental rights vary
38
considerably across the United States. However, ICWA provides the strongest
39
uniform protections for Indian parents regardless of which state they reside in.
The voluntary termination of parental rights or consent to foster care placement is
40
only valid if made in writing before a judge. Additionally, the consent must be
“accompanied by the presiding judge’s certificate that the terms and
consequences of the consent were fully explained in detail and were fully
41
understood by the parent or Indian custodian.”
Voluntary consent to “termination of parental rights . . . or adoptive
placement of . . . an Indian child . . . may be withdrawn for any reason at any
42
time prior to the entry of a final decree of termination or adoption.”
Furthermore, an Indian parent has up to two years after a final adoption decree to
43
file a petition seeking to vacate the adoption due to fraud or duress. This twoyear window exceeds the typical statute of limitations requiring that parents file
44
claims within one year.
A court may only involuntarily terminate parental rights relating to an Indian
child if “the continued custody of the child by the parent . . . is likely to result in

36. Compare In re Desiree F., 83 Cal. App. 4th 360 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding failure to give notice to the
tribe was grounds to render the proceedings void) with In re M.S.S., 936 P.2d 36 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that failure to give tribal notice required remand to determine whether the proceedings were
prejudiced, and if so would be found invalid).
37. 25 U.S.C. § 1914.
38. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CONSENT TO ADOPTION, STATE STATUTES, 5 (2013), available at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/consent.pdf [hereinafter STATE STATUTES] (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review). For example, California requires consent to be signed in the presence of
an Adoption Service Provider. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8801.3, 8700 (West 2013). However in Idaho, consent must
be signed before a judge or magistrate on the required Idaho form. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16–1506 (2009).
39. See generally STATE STATUTES, supra note 38, at 8–92 (listing state statutes most of which do not
require a parent to appear before a judge to effectuate voluntary consent to terminate parental rights).
40. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 1913(c).
43. Id. § 1913(d).
44. See, e.g. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-104(7)(a) (West 2013) (allowing only ninety-one days to establish
fraud in an adoption proceeding); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26-33-360 (West 2005) (providing one year to
petition the court to set aside an adoption).
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serious emotional or physical damage.” The recent Supreme Court ruling in
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, also known as “the Baby Veronica case,” limited
46
this clause to cases where the Indian parent already has custody of the child.
In addition to a showing of harm from continued custody, involuntary
termination of parental rights under ICWA requires a showing “that active efforts
have been made to provide remedial services . . . designed to prevent the breakup
47
of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.”
Interpreting these clauses barring involuntary termination of parental rights is at
the heart of the “existing Indian family” exception as decided in both Baby Boy
48
L. and Adoptive Couple.
3. ICWA Protects Tribal Interests and Subsumes Individual Interests of
Children in Placement Preference Decisions
Under ICWA, the tribal nations’ interests are inextricably linked to the best
49
interests of Indian children. While the provisions of ICWA focus predominantly
on child custody proceedings, a desire to protect and preserve Indian culture
50
drove the Act’s passage.
ICWA requires “placement . . . in . . . homes [that] . . . reflect the unique
51
values of Indian culture.” In adoptive or foster care placements, ICWA gives
preference to “a member of the child’s . . . family, [followed by] other members
52
of the Indian child’s tribe, [and finally to] other Indian families.” An Indian
child should be placed in a non-Indian home only if all other options yield no
53
suitable placements. In instances where a child cannot be placed with members
of his or her tribe, ICWA mandates that the child be placed with an Indian family
from any other tribal nation, regardless of cultural differences, before being
54
placed with a non-Indian family.

45. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).
46. 133 S.Ct. 2552, 2560 (2013).
47. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d).
48. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S.Ct. 2552, 2557 (2013) (holding that the ICWA provisions
barring involuntary termination of parental rights do not apply to Indian parents who never had custody of their
children); In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982) (holding that the ICWA provision
barring involuntary termination of rights applies only to parents who have custody of their children).
49. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (“[T]here is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and
integrity of Indian tribes than their children.”).
50. See id. ( . . . “[T]he United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children who are
members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.”); id. § 1902 (“The Congress hereby declares that
it is the policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes . . . . ”).
51. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
52. Id. § 1915(a)–(b).
53. See id. (delineating placement preferences of Indian children).
54. Id.
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Notably, nothing in ICWA requires that a court consider the best interests of
55
the Indian child when determining placement preferences. As a result, states
have utilized the good cause exception to these placement preferences to
56
effectuate the best interest of children subject to ICWA. Under the good cause
exception, courts may refuse to follow placement preferences only where there is
57
good cause to do so. However, the lack of definition of what constitutes good
58
cause has spawned extensive litigation.
D. Exception to ICWA: The Existing Indian Family Exception
"The ‘existing Indian family’ exception is" a court made doctrine that
exempts "application of the ICWA" in those cases where the Indian child’s
family has not “maintained a significant social, cultural, or political relationship
59
60
with [their] tribe.” State courts applying the EIFE rely on legislative intent,
reasoning that Congress enacted ICWA to prevent the breakup of Indian
61
families. Where there is no Indian family to break up, either because it never
existed or had already broken apart prior to the custody proceedings, courts
62
reason that ICWA does not apply.

55. Id. § 1901(3); see also id. §§ 1915–1923 (delineating placement preference requirements for Indian
children).
56. Id. § 1915(a). Case law amply supports this. See, e.g., In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361, 1363–
64 (Alaska 1993) (holding that the best interests of the child supports good cause to decline to follow ICWA
placement preferences).
57. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
58. See id. (stating placement preferences should apply except upon good cause, which is not defined in
the Act). ICWA does not define “good cause” and courts have come to vastly differing opinions as to what
constitutes good cause in declining to apply placement preferences. NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND, A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT 125–126 (2007), available at http://narf.org/icwa/print/all.pdf
[hereinafter GUIDE] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Compare In re Baby Boy Doe, 902 P.2d 477, 487
(Idaho 1995) (upholding the trial court’s use of the best interest of the child in the good cause calculus and
refusing to follow ICWA placement preferences) with In re Custody of S.E.G., 521 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn.
1994) (“[A] finding of good cause cannot be based simply on a determination that placement outside the
preferences would be in the child’s best interests.”).
59. Barbara Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New Understanding of
State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 625 (2002).
60. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982), overruled by In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d
543 (Kan. 2009) (holding ICWA should only apply to prevent the “removal of Indian children from an existing
Indian family unit”). The holding of Baby Boy L. and the EIFE was recently overturned by the Kansas Supreme
Court in In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543, 544 (Kan. 2009).
61. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (“[A]n alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by the
removal . . . of their children.”).
62. Toni Hahn Davis, The Existing Indian Family Exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 69 N.D. L.
REV. 465, 476 (1993); see e.g. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 188 (Kan. 1982) (holding ICWA
does not apply because there is no Indian home to break up).
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1. History of the Existing Indian Family Exception
The Kansas Supreme Court first recognized and articulated the EIFE in
63
Adoption of Baby Boy L. In that case, the non-Indian mother sought to place her
baby with a non-Indian adoptive couple after the Indian father was incarcerated
64
for battery, assaulting police officers, and inciting a riot. Although the child was
a qualified member of the Kiowa tribe, the Court concluded that the child was
not raised in an Indian family, and thus ICWA did not apply because there was
65
no Indian family to break up. The Court emphasized the fact that the mother
would revoke her consent for any adoption that might lead to placement in an
66
Indian home, and would instead raise the child herself. Further, because the
Court decided the father did not have, nor did he ever have, custody of the child,
67
the child was not part of an Indian family, and thus ICWA did not apply.
2. Exception in Decline, But Not Dead Yet
Of all the court decisions and interpretations of ICWA, adoption of the EIFE
68
69
is the most controversial and varies among jurisdictions. At its zenith, just
70
twelve states contemplated the EIFE , and even fewer ultimately adopted it in
71
one form or another. Currently, the EIFE is on the decline, and only six states
72
still apply it.
63. 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982), overruled by In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009) (holding ICWA
should only apply to prevent the “removal of Indian children from an existing Indian family unit”).
64. Id. at 178–79.
65. Id. at 174–175, 177.
66. Id. at 177.
67. Id. at 174.
68. STEPHEN PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 303 (4th ed. 2012).
69. At one time, nearly half the states accepted the EIFE; however, currently only six states apply the
EIFE. Dan Lewerenz & Padraic McCoy, The End of “Existing Indian Family” Jurisprudence: Holyfield at 20,
in the Matter of A.J.S., and the Last Gasps of a Dying Doctrine, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV., 684, 686–87
(2009–2010). The states still applying the EIFE include Tennessee, Indiana, Missouri, Alabama, Kentucky, and
Louisiana. Id. at 687 n.10.
70. States rejecting the EIFE by statute or through case law are: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington. Tana M. Fye, The Existing Indian Family Exception to the
Indian Child Welfare Act, 37 FAM. L. REP. 1352 (May 24, 2011), available at http://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/the-existing-indian-family-exception-to-53130/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Illinois is
curious in that sources report that the state rejected the EIFE in In re S.S., 657 N.E.2d 935 (Ill. 1995), yet the
majority actually failed to endorse or reject the doctrine. See id. at 946 (“The majority is remiss for its failure to
address . . . the primary issue raised by the parties . . . i.e., the validity . . . of the existing Indian family
doctrine.”).
71. States that applied the EIFE are: Alabama (S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App.
1990)), Kentucky (Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Ky. 1996)), Louisiana (Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d
331, 335 (La. Ct. App. 1995)) Tennessee (In re Morgan, No. 02A01- 9608-CH-00206, 1997 WL 716880 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1997)), Washington (In re Adoption of Crews, 825 P.2d 305, 311 (Wash. 1992), abrogated
by WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.040(3) (West 2013)); Indiana (In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298,
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The U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
73
Holyfield created a turning point in judicial acceptance of the “existing Indian
74
family” exception. Before Holyfield, most courts refusing to apply the EIFE
cited the congressional intent to promote tribal interests and maintain tribal
75
membership, finding that to apply the EIFE would negate tribal interests. After
Holyfield, more courts aligned with this reasoning, and pointed to language in
76
Holyfield emphasizing tribal preservation to justify invalidating the EIFE.
Critics of the EIFE assert that it is a bald attempt to circumvent the
requirements of ICWA and impose white, middle class cultural values on Indian
77
children and their families. However, in an increasingly multi-ethnic and multicultural modern America, the fear of acculturation of Indians into the dominant
78
westernized culture is no longer so simple. These detractors fail to consider that
79
white, middle class America is being subsumed through diffussionism, and just
because an Indian child is not being raised in an Indian home does not mean the
80
child is being raised in a white, middle class home either. The United States,
through immigration and cultural diffusion, is experiencing rapid changes in

303 (Ind. 1988)), Missouri (In Interest of S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)), Kansas (In re
Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 177 (Kan. 1982), overruled by In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543 (Kan.
2009)), South Dakota, (Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650, 654 (S.D. 1987), abrogated by In re Adoption of
Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1990)), Oklahoma (In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1064
(Okla.1985), abrogated by OKLA. STAT. ANN.. tit. 10, §§ 40.1,40.3 (West 2009)). California adopted the EIFE
only in the Second Appellate District, which was subsequently abrogated by statute. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 507, 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), abrogated by CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 224(a)(1) (West 2008).
72. These states are: Alabama (S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So.2d 1187, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990)), Indiana (In
re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 303 (Ind.1988)), Missouri (In Interest of S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 609
(Mo. Ct. App. 1986)), Kentucky (Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Ky. 1996)), Louisiana (Hampton v.
J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331, 335 (La. Ct. App. 1995)), and Tennessee (In re Morgan, No. 02A01-9608-CH-00206,
1997 WL 716880 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1997)).
73. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
74. Infra Part IV.D.
75. See, e.g., A.B.M. v. M.H., 651 P.2d 1170, 1172–1173 (Alaska 1982) (rejecting the “existing Indian
family” exception since ICWA preserves not only family relationships, but also tribal interests).
76. Infra Part IV.D.2.
77. See Cheyanna L. Jaffke, The “Existing Indian Family” Exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act:
The States’ Attempt to Slaughter Tribal Interests in Indian Children, 66 LA. L. REV. 733, 741 (2006)
(contending the abuses ICWA was passed to prevent continue with the use of the “Existing Indian Family”
exception in state courts).
78. See John W. Berry, Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation, 46 APPLIED PSYCHOL. 5, 6 (“[T]here
is now substantial evidence to document [that] . . . individuals generally act in ways that correspond to cultural
influences and expectations,” and individuals change their behavior in response to dominant cultural influence).
79. Diffusionism, or cultural diffusion, is the process of one culture both shaping and being shaped by
other cultures. See Derek H. Alderman, Cultural Change and Diffusion: Geographic Patterns, Social Processes,
and Contact Zones, in 21ST CENTURY GEOGRAPHY: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 123, 126 (Joseph P. Stoltman
ed., 2012) (“[S]ociety . . . is characterized by diversity and multiple interests rather than being a common,
unitary whole.”).
80. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF COMM., STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS: CALIFORNIA (Dec. 17, 2013),
available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(reporting that non-Hispanic whites only comprise 39.4% of the total California population).
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81

societal composition, and the oppression that Congress designed ICWA to
82
eliminate may be less concerning today.
III. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ICWA AND THE "EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY"
EXCEPTION AS A REMEDY
83

The modern trend is to reject the “existing Indian family” doctrine, and in
those states that have either statutorily rejected the EIFE or adopted ICWA
84
through state legislation, the opinion in Adoptive Couple is probably of little
85
consequence. States are not bound to apply the EIFE and are free to pass more
86
restrictive laws to protect Indian family rights. However, in those states that
have not statutorily adopted ICWA, the Court in Adoptive Couple warns that
constitutional violations may occur when applying those provisions implicated in
the “existing Indian family” exception to situations where there is no Indian
87
family to breakup. Further, there is ample evidence to suggest that ICWA itself,
with or without the “existing Indian family” exception, is unconstitutional, both
as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Tenth Amendment.
However, states should still adopt and apply the EIFE because it helps avoid
violating the equal protection rights of Indian children, as discussed in Part A.
Additionally, as discussed in Part B of this section, application of the “existing
Indian family” exception provides states latitude to limit ICWA in cases where
88
there is no existing Indian family to breakup.

81. See generally Alderman, supra note, at 79 (“[S]ociety . . . is characterized by diversity and multiple
interests rather than being a common, unitary whole.”).
82. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Race & Child Welfare: Disproportionality, Disparity, Discrimination:
Re-Assessing the Facts, Re-thinking the Policy Options 8, 13–14 (July 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/cap/cap-conferences/rd-conference/rd-conferencepapers/rdconceptpaper-final.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (arguing that low socio-economic
status and the need to protect children from abuse drive children into foster care, rather than race or
discrimination).
83. See supra Part II.D.2.
84. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712B.1 (West Supp. 2013) (codifying ICWA into Michigan
state law by way of the Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act).
85. See ASS’N ON AM. INDIAN AFFAIRS, A GUIDE TO THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN ADOPTIVE
COUPLE V. BABY GIRL 11–14 (2013), available at http://www.indian-affairs.org/Analysis%20of%20Adoptive
%20Couple%20v%20%20Baby%20Girl%20-%20final.pdf [hereinafter GUIDE TO ADOPTIVE COUPLE] (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (arguing the impact of Adoptive Couple in those states with greater protections
for Indian families will likely be minimal).
86. Id.; See, e.g., A.B.M. v. M.H., 651 P.2d 1170, 1172–1173 (Alaska 1982) (rejecting the “existing
Indian family” exception becasue ICWA preserves not only family relationships, but tribal interests).
87. Infra Part IV.E.
88. Infra Part IV.
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A. ICWA Violates the Equal Protection Clause Under the Fourteenth
Amendment
The Equal Protection Clause affords all persons within the United States the
89
right to equal protection under the law, and all laws based on racial categories
90
violate the Constitution unless they meet strict scrutiny. Because the Supreme
Court has concluded that the term “Indian” refers to a political affiliation, not an
91
ethnic or racial group, some courts have concluded that laws such as ICWA are
92
constitutional. But Congress did not pass ICWA to protect the political
affiliation of Indians; Congress enacted it to protect Indian culture and families,
which are generally established through familial heritage, and consequently,
93
race. The legal fiction that “Indian” is a political affiliation and not a racial
category is further discredited in that Indian tribes do not enroll members on the
basis of member agreement with the politics of the tribe, but on the basis of blood
94
quantum and familial ancestry. Even the U.S. Census Bureau defines
95
“American Indian” as a racial category.
Further, the law bars state courts from changing or establishing a child’s
custodial arrangement based solely on racial or ethnic reasons, because doing so
96
violates the Equal Protection Clause. Yet, ICWA requires states to place Indian
97
children in Indian homes. The California Second District Court of Appeal
agrees that ICWA placement preferences are racially determined, and has held

89. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
90. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–16 (1944) (“It should be noted . . . that all legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.”); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll governmental action based on race . . . should be
subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that . . . equal protection of the laws has not been infringed.”).
91. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974) (holding that the Bureau of Indian Affairs did not
violate the due process rights of non-Indian employees when it gave employment preference to Indians because
“Indian” is a political affiliation).
92. See, e.g., In re Vincent M., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 321, 335–36 (holding that ICWA does not violate the
constitution because it does not classify children based on race, but upon political affiliation and eligibility for
tribal membership).
93. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3)–(5) (2004) (finding the U.S. has an interest in protecting Indian culture,
families, and tribal integrity).
94. See, e.g. Tribal Citizenship, CHEROKEE NATION, http://www.cherokee.org/Services/Tribal
Citizenship.aspx (last visited Jan. 2, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“To be eligible for
Cherokee Nation citizenship, individuals must provide documents connecting them to an enrolled direct
ancestor who is listed on the Dawes Roll with a blood degree.”); Davis, supra note 62, at 469 (“Since the status
of a child as an Indian under ICWA is dependent upon tribal membership, which in turn depends on racial
heritage, ICWA gives sanction to racial considerations in . . . custody matters.”).
95. See KAREN R. HUMES, ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN:
2010 2 (2011) (listing five racial categories of “White, Black or African American, American Indian or Alaska
Native, Asian, and Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander” for the 2010 census).
96. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–34 (1984).
97. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)–(d) (2004) (requiring Indian children be placed with members of the
child’s tribe or other Indian families before non-Indians).
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that ICWA runs afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment without the “existing Indian
family” exception, stating that:
[A]ny application of ICWA which is triggered by an Indian child’s
genetic heritage, without substantial social, cultural or political
affiliations between the child’s family and a tribal community, is an
application based solely, or at least predominantly, upon race and is
subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause . . . [I]t is
clear that ICWA’s purpose is not served by an application of the Act to
children who are of Indian descent, but whose parents have no significant
relationship with an Indian community. If ICWA is applied to such
98
children, such application deprives them of equal protection of the law.
Because ICWA requires placement preferences based upon race, Indian
children are sometimes denied the right to permanent placement and a stable
environment, as the number of adoptive homes available to Indian children are
99
100
fewer than those for non-Indian children. Further, in cases such as Holyfield
101
and Adoptive Couple, Indian children can be removed from stable adoptive
placements under ICWA solely on the basis of race—an unfortunate outcome not
102
experienced by non-Indian children. Thus, while the legal community plays a
game of semantics, concluding that “Indian” denotes a political affiliation in
order to avoid constitutional concerns, tribal membership requires ancestry,
103
which is rooted in genetic and racial ties, implicating equal protection concerns.
Courts should take note of Adoptive Couple’s concern with the potential violation
of Indian children’s constitutional rights when applying ICWA to preserve tribal
104
interests over the best interest of the child.

98. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 528 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
99. See id. at 527 (finding that Indian children have limited options compared to non-Indian children in
finding homes).
100. Infra Part IV.D.1.
101. Infra Part IV.A.
102. See U.S.C. § 1914 (2004) (allowing invalidation of any action, including adoptive placements, that
violates the requirements of sections 1911–1913).
103. See, e.g., Tribal Citizenship, supra note 94 (“To be eligible for Cherokee Nation citizenship,
individuals must provide documents connecting them to an enrolled direct ancestor who is listed on the Dawes
Roll with a blood degree.”); see also Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. at 527 (finding that Indian children have limited
options compared to non-Indian children in finding homes).
104. See 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013) (noting equal protection concerns when applying ICWA in a
manner contrary to a child’s best interest).
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B. ICWA Violates the Tenth Amendment
105

Among those states that have not statutorily adopted ICWA, there is a
strong argument that federal application of ICWA violates state sovereignty
106
under the Tenth Amendment. ICWA’s constitutionality in this regard rests on
the congressional assertion that ICWA is a permissible regulation of Indian
107
affairs under the Indian Commerce Clause. Courts have interpreted the Indian
Commerce Clause broadly, extending beyond the traditional definition of
commerce, to include congressional plenary control over all areas of Indian
108
affairs. Without this overly broad definition, it is impossible to conceive how
the adoption and custody of children, a power exclusively within the sphere of
109
state control, qualifies as a commercial transaction. As Justice Thomas laments
in his concurring opinion in Adoptive Couple, the original construction of the
Indian Commerce clause was to regulate and limit state trading with Indian
110
tribes.
However, even if Congress has plenary control over Indian affairs, it is hard
to conceive of how this power extends beyond control of custody cases within
111
tribal jurisdiction to those in state courts. When Congress legislates matters that
are traditionally under state control (e.g. domestic relations), there must be a
substantial relationship between the law enacted (e.g. ICWA) and the enumerated
112
power given to Congress (e.g. Indian Commerce Clause) justifying the law.
There is very little nexus between the power to regulate trade with tribes and
113
adoption and custody proceedings involving Indian children. Thus, ICWA itself

105. Kentucky and Missouri, for example have not adopted ICWA statutorily. Some states have codified
ICWA language into their state laws voluntarily. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 224 (West 2008)
(incorporating federal ICWA language into state law).
106. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2566–67 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the Constitution
does not permit the federal government to intrude upon state sovereignty in the area of domestic relations).
107. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(1) (2004) (“[C]lause 3, section 8, article I of the United States Constitution
provides that ‘The Congress shall have Power [t]o regulate [c]ommerce with Indian tribes’ and, through this and
other constitutional authority, Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs . . . . ”). But see United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (holding that “the existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by
itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.”).
108. Marcia Zug, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: Two-And-A-Half Ways to Destroy Indian Law, 111
MICH. L. REV. 46, 50 (2013).
109. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S.Ct. at 2567 (Thomas, J., concurring) (lamenting that commerce
traditionally meant trade with Indian tribes, not “noneconomic activity such as the adoption of children”).
110. Id.
111. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (“An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any
child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation . . . . ”).
112. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 (holding that a substantial nexus is required between legislation
enacted and the enumerated power allowing the legislation).
113. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S.Ct. at 2571 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that commerce and tribal
trade are within the nexus of the Indian Commerce Clause).
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is an overreach of Congressional power that invades state sovereignty in the area
114
of domestic relations, and courts should limit ICWA accordingly.
IV. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE SUPPORTS LIMITING ICWA THROUGH USE
OF THE “EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY” EXCEPTION
While most jurisdictions do not recognize the “existing Indian family”
115
exception, the Supreme Court has never struck it down and has denied multiple
116
petitions for certiorari to decide the matter. The failure of the Supreme Court to
117
tackle the EIFE, combined with its recent decision in Adoptive Couple, compels
the conclusion that the Court supports state action to limit the reach of ICWA in
cases that do not implicate the break-up of an existing Indian family unit through
118
the EIFE. Part A will explain how Adoptive Couple supports the “existing
Indian family” exception, providing state courts the necessary authority to use the
exception. Part B will explain how Adoptive Couple only applies to specific
subsections of ICWA, and not the entire act. Part C will elucidate how Adoptive
Couple mirrors the policy-based reasoning and analysis found in Baby Boy L.
Part D will explain how Holyfield did not hold the “existing Indian family”
exception invalid, and thus does not negate Supreme Court approval of the EIFE.
Lastly, Part E will argue that the Court’s failure to grant certiorari to any cases
challenging the “existing Indian family” exception indicates a willingness to
accept the doctrine.
A. How Adoptive Couple Supports the “Existing Indian Family” Exception
Baby Boy L. and Adoptive Couple are nearly factually identical, and the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Adoptive Couple closely parallels the reasoning in
Baby Boy L. It is therefore logical to infer that Adoptive Couple actively endorses
the application of the “existing Indian family” exception, as created in Baby Boy
L., where a non-Indian custodial parent initiates a voluntary custody placement

114. See id. (stating that “application of ICWA to . . . [adoption] proceedings would be unconstitutional”).
115. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g. Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331 (La. Ct. App. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1158 (1996)
(denying review on whether the application of the EIFE is permissible); Hoots ex rel. A.B. v. K.B., 663 N.W.2d
625 (N.D. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 972 (2004) (refusing to review whether failure to apply the EIFE
violated the minor’s constitutional rights).
117. Infra Part IV.D; see, e.g., Hampton, 658 So. 2d at 331 (denying review on whether the application of
the EIFE is permissible); Hoots, 663 N.W.2d 625 (refusing to review whether failure to apply the EIFE violated
the minor’s constitutional rights).
118. Infra Part IV.A.2.
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1. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl—Background and Factual Similarities to
Baby Boy L.
Baby Veronica, the child at the center of the custody dispute in Adoptive
Couple, was born in 2009 to a non-Indian, Hispanic mother and a tribally
119
enrolled Cherokee Indian father. The mother became pregnant following the
120
couple’s engagement. After the father “refused to provide any financial
support” to the mother during her pregnancy, the relationship soured and the
121
mother broke off the engagement. When given the option of paying child
support or relinquishing his parental rights, the father opted to relinquish his
122
rights. The mother, unable to care for the child without support, put the child up
123
for adoption and selected a non-Indian family with whom to place the child.
Four months after the child’s birth, the father received notice of the impending
adoption; he signed the papers indicating he was not contesting the adoption,
though he later testified that he believed he was merely signing away his parental
124
rights to the mother.
The father later contested the adoption claiming that as a member of the
Cherokee Nation, ICWA provisions limiting involuntary terminations applied,
and the document he signed did not satisfy the requirements of section 1913(a)
125
effecting a voluntary relinquishment of his parental rights. The Cherokee
Nation, which had been unaware of the adoption proceeding prior to this point
126
due to a misspelling of the birth father’s name, also moved to intervene. Nearly
twenty-seven months after the adoptive couple took Baby Veronica home as their
127
daughter, the Supreme Court of South Carolina determined that the biological
father had not voluntarily relinquished his rights and ordered Baby Veronica into
128
his custody. Further, the court determined that section 1912(f), barring
involuntary termination of parental rights absent a showing of “serious emotional
or physical damage to the child,” applied, and that the adoptive couple failed to
129
make such a showing.
The adoptive couple appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari as to
“[w]hether a non-custodial [Indian] parent can invoke ICWA to block an

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
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133 S.Ct. 2552, 2558 (2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 561 (S.C. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 554–555.
Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2556.
Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 567.
Id at 564, 580.
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130

adoption voluntarily . . . initiated by a non-Indian parent . . . . ” The Court
assumed the father was an Indian parent under ICWA and held that even though
Baby Veronica was an Indian child under the same, sections 1912(f) and 1912(d),
barring involuntary termination of parental rights, did not apply where the Indian
131
parent never had custody.
The factual circumstances surrounding both Baby Boy L. and Adoptive
132
Couple are nearly identical. In both cases, an unwed, non-Indian mother sought
133
to place her baby with carefully chosen adoptive parents. In both cases, each
father was an enrolled member of a federally recognized Indian tribe in
134
Oklahoma. Neither of the fathers had custody of their children under state
law—the father abandoned the child before birth in Adoptive Couple, and the
135
father was incarcerated for domestic abuse at the time of birth in Baby Boy L.
And in both cases, the Indian fathers sought to block the adoptions by invoking
136
sections 1912(f) and 1912(d) of ICWA. It is not surprising then that both courts
came to the same conclusion—that ICWA should not be used to block the
decision by a non-Indian custodial mother to voluntarily place her baby up for
137
adoption simply because her child has a small quantum of Indian blood.
Because the facts of these two cases are so analogous, Adoptive Couple
essentially decided the same issue decided in Baby Boy L.—to limit certain
138
provisions of ICWA to “existing Indian families.”
B. Limited Scope of the "Existing Indian Family" Exception as Applicable to
Sections 1912(d) and 1912(f).
In many jurisdictions, when the “existing Indian family” exception applies,
the courts have used broad language implying that the EIFE acts as a complete
139
bar to applying any portion of ICWA. Because the Supreme Court’s holding in
Adoptive Couple applied only to sections 1912(d) and (f), the Court failed to
130. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (No. 12399).
131. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2555, 2560.
132. See id at 2558–59 (detailing the factual circumstances of the case); In re Adoption of Baby Boy L.,
643 P.2d 168, 172–73 (Kan. 1982) overruled by In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543, 544–45 (Kan. 2009) (detailing the
factual circumstances of the case).
133. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558; Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 172.
134. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558; Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 172.
135. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558; Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 172.
136. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2555; Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175.
137. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2556 (stating that just because Baby Girl is 3/256 Cherokee does
not mean that ICWA should apply); Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 172 (noting that while the child is five-sixteenths
Kiowa, ICWA should not be used to prevent the custodial mother from choosing adoption).
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 173, 176 (“We conclude the trial court was correct in its
determination that ICWA, by its own terms, does not apply . . . . ”); S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Ala.
1990) (holding, without qualifying to what extent, that ICWA is not applicable).
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140

adopt a broad application of the “existing Indian family” exception. However,
this does not preclude the conclusion that the Court endorsed the “existing Indian
141
family” exception given its early historical application. The “existing Indian
family” exception, as cited in early cases, appears only to apply to involuntary
termination of parental rights under 1912(d) and 1912(f)—the same sections at
142
issue in Adoptive Couple.
Courts initially applied the EIFE only in cases where involuntary termination
of parental rights of Indian parents were at issue, though the courts were not
143
specific as to what parts of ICWA the EIFE applied. However, the specific
sections that implicate ICWA with regard to involuntary termination of parental
rights are 1912(f) and 1912(d)—the very sections the Court addressed in
144
Adoptive Couple. While the language used by these courts implies the EIFE
bars the application of all of ICWA, this is not a forgone conclusion, as in each
case the courts limited their holding (the inapplicability of ICWA) to the facts of
145
the case (involuntary termination of the Indian parents’ rights).
In Baby Boy L., the court addressed the issue of involuntarily terminating the
parental rights of the putative father—the same question sections 1912(f) and
146
1912(d) address. Likewise, the Alabama Supreme Court adopted the EIFE to
prevent an Indian father from invoking ICWA and terminating his right to block
147
a voluntary adoption proceeding initiated by the mother. The court did not
specifically reference section 1912(f) or 1912(d) when terminating the father’s
right to object, but these sections are implied because they are relevant to
148
whether the father’s consent was necessary to proceed with the adoption. The
court noted that “[t]he ‘Existing Indian Family’ exception has been applied to
those fact[ual] situations involving the voluntary relinquishment of an

140. See 133 S. Ct. at 2560, 2562 (2013) (holding that sections 1912(d) and (f), as well as section
1915(a), were specifically inapplicable).
141. See, e.g., Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 176 (determining whether ICWA barred involuntary termination
of parental rights).
142. 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
143. See, e.g., E.J.P., 571 So. 2d at 1189 (“The “Existing Indian Family” exception has been applied to
those fact situations involving the voluntary relinquishment of an illegitimate Indian child by its non-Indian
mother.”); In re Adoption of D.M.J., 741 P.2d 1386, 1389 (Okla. 1985), overruled by In re Baby Boy L., 103
P.3d 1099, 1103 (Okla. 2004) (holding ICWA does not apply where the Indian parent does not have custody,
and remedial measures are not required when the family has already broken up).
144. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d), (f) (2004); Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2559–64.
145. See Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175 (“[W]e are of the opinion that to apply the Act to a factual
situation such as the one before us would be to violate the policy and intent of Congress rather than uphold
them.”) (emphasis added); “[I]t was never the intent of Congress that the Act would apply to a factual situation
such as is before the court.” (emphasis added) Id.
146. Id.; see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d)–(f) (outlining the procedures for involuntary termination of parental
rights).
147. See E.J.P., 571 So. 2d at 1188 (stating “[t]he father appeal[ed] and assert[ed] that the trial court erred
in refusing to follow specific procedures outlined in the [ICWA]”).
148. Id.
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illegitimate Indian child by its non-Indian mother.” Further, the court limited
the EIFE stating, “[w]e find the facts of this case lend themselves to the
application of an ‘Existing Indian Family’ exception”—that is, to involuntary
150
terminations, which would be governed by sections 1912(f) and 1912(d).
Additionally, some early courts did specifically evaluate sections 1912(f) and
151
1912(d) to conclude that the EIFE applied. For example, the Missouri Supreme
Court determined that the “existing Indian family” exception blocked invocation
of sections 1912(f) and 1912(d) to prevent the involuntary termination of parental
rights and subsequent adoption of the child where there was no custody by the
152
Indian parent and Indian family to breakup.
While the “existing Indian family” exception expanded with various court
interpretations to apply to custody situations beyond involuntary termination and
subsequent adoption, courts did not intend that the original doctrine, as
153
articulated in Baby Boy L., apply so broadly. A more limited application of the
154
“existing Indian family” exception finds support in Adoptive Couple. Thus, it is
reasonable to conclude the Supreme Court has embraced the EIFE as it was
originally articulated—that the “existing Indian family” exception applies to
those factual situations involving the voluntary relinquishment of an illegitimate
155
Indian child by a custodial non-Indian parent.
C. The Policy-Based Reasoning and Analysis of Adoptive Couple Mirror Baby
Boy L.
The policy rationale driving the outcome in both Baby Boy L. and Adoptive
156
Couple is the same—to effectuate Congress’ intent to protect Indian families.
157
The statement of congressional intent prefacing ICWA provides the rationale

149. Id. at 1189.
150. Id.; see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d)–(f) (outlining the procedures for involuntary termination of parental
rights).
151. In Interest of S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 607 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding section 1912(f) does not
apply where the Indian father never had custody of the child).
152. Id.
153. See Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 264 (Ky. 1996) (holding the “existing Indian family” doctrine
applies to bar transfer of jurisdiction to tribal court in a divorce action).
154. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2555, 2560–62 (2013) (holding sections 1912(d)
and 1912(f) do not apply to block a voluntary adoption where a non-custodial Indian parent abandons the child
before birth).
155. See Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 176 (Kan. 1982), overruled by In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d
543, 550 (Kan. 2009) (holding a non-custodial Indian parent cannot invoke ICWA to prevent the voluntary
adoptive placement by a custodial non-Indian parent where no familial unit existed to be broken up); Adoptive
Couple, 133 S.Ct. at 2560–62 (holding sections 1912(d) and 1912(f) do not apply to block a voluntary adoption
where a non-custodial Indian parent abandons the child before birth).
156. Adoptive Couple,133 S. Ct. at 2557; Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175.
157. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2004).
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158

behind this policy-based exception. The Kansas Supreme Court in Baby Boy L.
articulated and relied on this rationale stating “[a] careful study of the legislative
history behind the Act and the Act itself discloses that the overriding concern of
Congress and the proponents of the Act was the maintenance of the family and
159
tribal relationships existing in Indian homes . . . . ” As in Baby Boy L., Adoptive
160
Couple begins its analysis with a discussion of ICWA’s purpose. The majority
opinion specifically references the importance of preventing the unwarranted
“removal of Indian children from their homes,” and explicitly holds that the
primary goal of the statute is “to counteract the unwarranted removal of Indian
161
children from Indian families,” just like in Baby Boy L. The majority in
Adoptive Couple came to the same conclusion, finding that the legislative intent
of “the Act was primarily . . . to stem the unwarranted removal of Indian children
162
from intact Indian families.” The Court in Baby Boy L. argued that Congress,
as stated in ICWA, was concerned with safeguarding families from involuntary
removals, but declared that “[t]hese issues are not present in an adoption
proceeding instituted on the voluntary consent of a non-Indian unwed mother of
an illegitimate child, where that child’s care and custody has, with the natural
mother’s permission, been with non-Indian proposed adoptive parents since the
163
child’s birth.”
In Baby Boy L., the Court stated that it would violate the intent of Congress
164
to apply ICWA under those factual circumstances. This is similar to Adoptive
Couple, where the Court articulated its belief that the provisions of ICWA do not
demand the unjust result of removing a child from the only parents she has
165
known simply because she has Indian heritage. The Court in Adoptive Couple
acknowledged the need to preserve Indian heritage, but felt it would violate
congressional intent to put children at a “disadvantage solely because an ancestor
166
. . . was an Indian.”
While the U.S. Supreme Court uses the word “intact” to describe which
Indian families ICWA applies to, this language is nearly identical to the language
167
used in Baby Boy L. to describe the “existing Indian family” exception. “Intact”

158. See Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 187 (finding “a statute apparently void on its face may be
constitutional when limited” to an interpretation that will carry out legislative intent).
159. Id. at 175.
160. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2557; Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175.
161. 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557, 2561 (2013) (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 2561.
163. Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175.
164. Id.
165. 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2556 (2013).
166. Id. at 2565.
167. See id. at 2557, 2561 (holding that ICWA was designed to prevent the unwarranted removal of
Indian children); Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175 (holding that ICWA is not implicated when an existing Indian
family is not being broken up).
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and “existing” are virtually synonymous in this context. In Adoptive Couple,
the majority holds that section 1912(f), barring “termination of parental rights . . .
in the absence of [evidence] . . . that the continued custody of the child . . . is
likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage,” requires the Indian
169
parent had custody prior to termination. The Court further stated that continued
custody is defined as one that “refers to a pre-existing state,” or in other words,
170
an existing familial relationship or family. Like Baby Boy L., which implicitly
held that section 1912(f) barring involuntary termination should only apply
171
where there is a “removal . . . from an existing Indian family unit,” Adoptive
Couple holds that 1912(f) should only apply where there is an issue of
172
“unwarranted removal of Indian children from Indian families.” Therefore,
according the Supreme Court, when a non-Indian parent arranges for the
adoption of a child with Indian heritage, an intact or existing Indian family is
required prior to applying the involuntary termination sections of ICWA.
In determining whether an existing family exists, both Baby Boy L. and
Adoptive Couple hold that ICWA does not apply when the Indian parent has not
173
had custody under state law. Like the Indian father in Adoptive Couple, the
Indian father in Baby Boy L., under state statute, did not have custody of his child
174
at the time of birth. Where there is no custody by the Indian parent, there is no
removal from an Indian family, and thus according to Adoptive Couple, the
“ICWA’s primary goal is not implicated” (i.e. preventing the break-up of an
175
existing Indian family).
While the South Carolina Supreme Court dismissed the idea that the
176
“existing Indian family” exception should apply in South Carolina, and
“summarily dismissed the position . . . that ICWA’s parental termination
provision, [section 1912(f)] does not apply to the voluntary adoption of an . . .
Indian child under the sole custody of a non-Indian parent (known as the
‘existing Indian family doctrine’),” the U.S. Supreme Court appears to

168. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2557, 2561 (holding that ICWA was designed to prevent
unwarranted removal of Indian children); Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175 (holding that ICWA is not implicated
where an existing Indian family is not being broken up).
169. 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2560 (2013).
170. See id. at 2560 (emphasis added) (holding that section 1912(f) of ICWA does not apply when the
Indian parent never had custody of the Indian child).
171. 643 P.2d at 175 (emphasis added).
172. 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2561 (2013) (emphasis added).
173. Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175–76; Adoptive Couple, 133 S.Ct. at 2560.
174. Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 174; Adoptive Couple, 133 S.Ct. at 2562.
175. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2555, 2561; see Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175 (holding ICWA is not
implicated where an existing Indian family is not being broken up).
176. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 558 n.17 (S.C. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013)
(“Given that its policy conflicts with the express purpose of ICWA, we take this opportunity to reject the
‘Existing Indian Family’ doctrine . . . ”).
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disagree. On appeal, it found that “ICWA’s primary goal [to prevent
unwarranted removal of Indian children from Indian families] is not implicated
when an Indian child’s adoption is voluntarily and lawfully initiated by a non178
Indian parent with sole custodial rights.”
Baby Boy L. and Adoptive Couple also found that ICWA’s other parental
termination provision, which requires offering remedial services prior to
179
termination, does not apply unless the termination of parental rights would
180
break up an Indian family.
Section 1912(d) provides that efforts should be made to prevent the
breakup of the Indian family . . . [and] reflect[s] the underlying thread
that runs throughout the entire Act . . . that the Act is concerned with the
removal of Indian children from an existing Indian family unit and the
181
resultant breakup of the Indian family.
Adoptive Couple, observing that the father had abandoned the family prior to
Baby Veronica’s birth, held that where “the ‘breakup of the Indian family’ has
long since occurred . . . [section] 1912(d) is inapplicable” because it is designed
182
to prevent the breakup of existing relationships. Conversely, Adoptive Couple
notes that “Indian parents who are already part of an ‘Indian family’ are provided
with access to remedial services . . . under § 1912(d) so that their ‘custody’ might
be ‘continued’ in a way that avoids . . . termination of parental rights under §
183
1912(f).” Thus, where there is no existing Indian family to break up, there is no
application of ICWA section 1912(d), and that is the very definition of the
184
“existing Indian family” exception.
While the “existing Indian family” exception has been cited as a complete
bar to the application of ICWA, the failure of Adoptive Couple to hold the same
185
does not refute the endorsement of the EIFE.
Because the original
manifestation of the EIFE focused solely on the applicability of the involuntary
termination provisions, and the language and rationale of Adoptive Couple is
nearly identical to that in cases applying the EIFE, it is rational to view Adoptive
186
Couple as an endorsement of the doctrine as it was originally articulated.
177. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (No. 12399); Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2555 (2013).
178. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2555.
179. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2004).
180. Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175; Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2555.
181. Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175.
182. 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2562 (2013).
183. Id. at 2563.
184. See id. (holding section 1912(d) only applies where the father had custody at some point); Baby Boy
L., 643 P.2d at 175 (holding ICWA only applies when there is an existing Indian family unit to breakup).
185. See supra Part IV.B
186. Id..
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D. Holyfield Did Not Overturn the "Existing Indian Family" Exception
Many scholars and state courts interpret the Supreme Court’s decision in
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield to hold the “existing Indian
187
family” exception invalid. To justify this interpretation, they rely on the factual
circumstances in the case, the Court’s focus on the importance of tribal
188
189
interests, and Congressional intent to limit state discretion. However, the
Supreme Court did not grant certiorari to Holyfield to determine the validity of
the “existing Indian family” exception, but rather to determine which court had
190
jurisdiction over the custody proceeding at issue. At most, the case stands for
the proposition that children who are domiciled on reservations are under the
jurisdiction of their tribes, and thus the “existing Indian family” exception does
191
not apply where the state does not have jurisdiction.
1. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield: Factual Background
and the Supreme Court Analysis
In Holyfield, an unwed Indian couple sought to place their twin infants in a
192
voluntary adoptive placement. Both parents were “enrolled members of . . .
[the] Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians and were residents and domiciliaries
193
of the Choctaw Reservation.” The parents left the reservation for the express
purpose of giving birth in order to avoid application of ICWA, and subsequent
194
tribal jurisdiction. The couple sought to place the infants with an adoptive
195
family of their choice without tribal intervention. The twins were placed with
the Holyfields immediately after birth, and resided with them for three years
before the Supreme Court vacated the adoption and ordered their case remanded
196
to tribal jurisdiction.

187. See B.J. JONES ET AL., THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT HANDBOOK 31 (2d ed. 2008) (stating
Holyfield clearly repudiated the “existing Indian family” exception); GUIDE, supra note 58 at 4 (claiming
“Holyfield . . . implicitly rejected the EIFE); In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 489–490 (N.D. 1990)
(citing Holyfield to overturn the “existing Indian family” exception in North Dakota).
188. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 58 (1989) (reasoning that the intent
of Congress was “to preserve tribal sovereignty over the domestic relations of tribe members”).
189. Id. at 45 (reasoning that the purpose of ICWA is to “make clear that in certain situations the state
courts d[o] not have jurisdiction over [Indian] child custody proceedings”).
190. Id. at 42 (declaring the sole issue was whether the children “were ‘domiciled’ on the reservation for
the purpose of determining which court should have jurisdiction).
191. Id. at 53.
192. Id. at 37–38.
193. Id. at 37.
194. Id. at 39.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 53.
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The sole issue on appeal was whether the twins were domiciled on the
197
reservation at birth, even though they were not born on tribal land. The
Holyfields argued that the twins were not domiciled on the reservation, as they
had never physically resided there, and thus the state court had jurisdiction over
198
the matter. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that because the mother was
199
domiciled on the reservation at the time of the birth, so were the twins. The
Court reasoned that “[s]ince most minors are legally incapable of forming the
requisite intent to establish a domicile, their domicile is determined by that of
200
their parents . . . even though they themselves had never been there.”
2. Erroneous Reliance on Holyfield to Justify the Rejection of the “Existing
Indian Family” Exception
The Holyfield Court vacated the adoption of two twin Indian babies, even
though they had never been raised with an Indian family and had never lived on a
201
reservation. Some scholars see this as striking down the “existing Indian
202
family” exception.
This interpretation is flawed, however, because it fails to consider the real
203
issue of jurisdiction that was before the court. Furthermore, portions of ICWA
can apply even when the “existing Indian family” exception blocks invocation of
204
sections 1912(f) and 1912(d).
Courts citing Holyfield to strike down the “existing Indian family” exception
rely not only on the factual circumstances of the case, but also on the language in
205
Holyfield emphasizing Congressional intent to protect the interests of the tribes.
For example, South Dakota, which had previously endorsed the “existing Indian

197. Id. at 42.
198. Id. at 39.
199. Id. at 48–49.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 53; see also Christine Metteer, Hard Cases Making Bad Law: The Need for Revision of the
Indian Child Welfare Act, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 419, 433–434 (1997–1998) (discussing how state courts
use Holyfield to justify striking down the “existing Indian family” exception).
202. See GUIDE, supra note 58 at 4 (concluding Holyfield implicitly rejects the EIFE because the children
at issue were never in an Indian home despite the Court applying ICWA).
203. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 42 (1989) (declaring the sole issue was whether the children at issue
“were ‘domiciled’ on the reservation” for the purpose of determining which court should have jurisdiction).
204. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2564 (2013) (finding that section 1915(a) of
ICWA, detailing placement preferences, did not apply only because no other party had sought to adopt the
child); Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982) overruled by In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543 (Kan.
2009) (creating the “existing Indian family” exception to avoid applying ICWA’s restrictions on involuntary
termination of parental rights).
205. See In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485, 489 (S.D. 1990) (citing the purpose of ICWA in
protecting tribal interests to support overruling previous application of the “existing Indian family” exception);
In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 977 (Alaska 1989) (noting that Congress intended ICWA to protect
tribes as well as parents).
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family” exception, reversed course and cited Holyfield when it refused to apply
207
the EIFE in Adoption of Baade. Baade relied on Holyfield’s focus on the
208
importance of tribal interests, stating “[i]n light of the United States Supreme
Court decision in . . . Holyfield . . . it is incorrect, when assessing ICWA’s
applicability to a particular case, to focus only upon the interests of an existing
209
family.” However, while Holyfield extensively details the intent of Congress to
protect tribal interests, it does so to justify why the tribe should have had
210
jurisdiction, not to strike down the “existing Indian family” exception. If courts
want to avoid applying the EIFE using congressional intent and concern for tribal
interests, they need only cite to those provisions of ICWA, which mention tribal
211
interests, directly. For example, courts can cite to section 1902, which declares
Congressional intent “to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes,”
212
though ICWA.
Lastly, the Holyfield Court details the congressional intent of ICWA to limit
213
state discretion, which courts have capitalized on to justify the refusal to apply
214
the “existing Indian family” exception. Holyfield declared that the states did not
have the discretion to define “domicile” as a key term in ICWA because “the
statute demonstrates that Congress perceived the States and their courts as partly
215
responsible for the problem it intended to correct.” Thus definitions of critical
216
terms cannot be dependent on state interpretations. Using this language, lower
courts have held that Holyfield struck down the “existing Indian family”
exception because what constitutes an “existing Indian family” is a matter of
217
state discretion.
206. Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650, 653 (S.D. 1987), abrogated by In re Adoption of Baade, 462
N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1990).
207. Baade, 462 N.W.2d at 489.
208. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49 (“Congress was concerned not solely about the interests of Indian
children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of Indian children
adopted by non-Indians.”).
209. Baade, 462 N.W.2d at 489.
210. See 490 U.S. at 41–42 (noting the central focus of ICWA is to protect tribes and the “exclusive tribal
jurisdiction provision” within the Act).
211. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (2004) (“[T]here is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence
and integrity of Indian tribes than their children.”); Id. § 1902 (“The Congress . . . declares that it is the policy
of this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian
tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards”) (emphasis added).
212. Id. § 1902.
213. See 490 U.S. at 44–45 (finding that because ICWA was enacted to prevent states from having
discretion in Indian custody proceedings, it is logical to presume they did not intend the states to have the right
to define key terms within the Act).
214. See In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 977–78 (Alaska 1989) (noting the purpose of ICWA
was to limit state discretion and counter prejudicial treatment of Indian children in refusing to apply the
“existing Indian family” exception).
215. 490 U.S. 30, 45.
216. See id.
217. See T.N.F., 781 P.2d at 977–78 (noting the purpose of ICWA was to limit state discretion and
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The discretionary nature of the “existing Indian family” exception appears to
place it at odds with the Act, the primary purpose of which was to strip states of
the right to determine the outcomes of custody decisions involving Indian
218
children. In addition to stripping the states of discretion, the ultimate goal of
ICWA is to protect both tribes and Indian families—two entities whose best
219
interest may not always coalesce. In those cases, the factual circumstances
should determine whose interests prevail. Viewing the case as jurisdictional in
220
nature, the Court focused on tribal interests in Holyfield, but that focus does not
preclude the use of the “existing Indian family” exception in situations that do
221
not implicate jurisdictional questions.
222
Holyfield is ultimately a jurisdictional case. Although the children at issue
in Holyfield had never been in the custody of Indian parents nor lived on the
223
reservation, the Court did not make its decision on the basis of those facts.
While scholars and courts may cite Holyfield when refusing to apply the
224
“existing Indian family” exception, the case does not strike down the EIFE.
E. The Supreme Court Has Never Granted Certiorari to a Case Challenging the
"Existing Indian Family" Exception
It is worth noting that the Supreme Court has never granted cert to any case
225
challenging the application of the “existing Indian family” exception. It is
possible the Court agrees with the EIFE but has been unwilling to tackle it

counter prejudicial treatment of Indian children in refusing to apply the “existing Indian family” exception).
218. Id.
219. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (2004) (“[T]here is no resource that is more vital to the continued
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children.”) with 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (“The Congress . . . declares
that it is the policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian children . . . and security of Indian . . .
families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their
families”); compare also Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 35 (considering the importance of children to the preservation
of tribes as stated in ICWA) with Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan. 1982) overruled by In re
A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009) (stressing ICWA goal of preserving Indian familial units).
220. See 490 U.S. at 42 (declaring the sole issue was whether the children “were ‘domiciled’ on the
reservation for the purpose of determining which court should have jurisdiction).
221. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2555 (2013) (holding ICWA provisions barring
involuntary termination of parental rights do not apply to Indian parents who never had custody of their
children).
222. 490 U.S. at 42 (declaring the sole issue was whether the children “were ‘domiciled’ on the
reservation for the purpose of determining which court should have jurisdiction).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See, e.g. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
872 (1986) (refusing to grant cert. upon the federal court’s upholding of Baby Boy L.); In re Bridget R. 41
Cal.App.4th 1483 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1060 (1997). It is worth noting that the Court has
never granted cert to cases challenging the refusal to apply the EIFE either. See In re Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d
925 (Idaho 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 860 (1993) (holding the “existing Indian family” exception does not
apply in Idaho).
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because doing so would implicate a discussion of the constitutional validity of
226
ICWA as a whole. While failing to strike down the EIFE is not necessarily
evidence of Court approval, the Roberts Court has intimated that failing to apply
227
the “existing Indian family” exception in those cases where parents voluntarily
place Indian children in adoptive homes may violate the Equal Protection
228
Clause. In refusing to apply sections 1912(d) and (f) in Adoptive Couple, the
Court reflects:
The [ICWA] was enacted to help preserve the cultural identity and
heritage of Indian tribes, but under the State Supreme Court’s reading,
the Act would put certain vulnerable children at a great disadvantage
solely because an ancestor—even a remote one—was an Indian. As
[South Carolina interpreted sections] 1912(d) and (f), [an] Indian father
could abandon his child . . . refuse any support for the birth mother . . .
and then could play his ICWA trump card at the eleventh hour to
override the mother’s decision and the child’s best interests. If this were
possible, many prospective adoptive parents would surely pause before
adopting any child who might possibly qualify as an Indian under ICWA.
229
Such an interpretation would raise equal protection concerns.
The Court does acknowledge the importance of culture and heritage, but also
recognizes that these aspects do not always take precedence over a child’s best
230
interests and right to equal protection in custody proceedings.
Thus, while failing to grant certiorari does not necessarily mean that the
Court endorses the lower courts’ holdings, there is evidence that the “existing
Indian family” exception implicates an equal protection issue that the Court is
231
unwilling to deal with. The language in Adoptive Couple hints that, where the
“existing Indian family” exception applies, requiring the application of ICWA
provisions barring involuntary termination would violate the constitutional rights
232
of Indian children. It stands to reason that the Court would not want to strike

226. See Zug, supra note 108, at 48, 50 (discussing the constitutional implications of ICWA, and possible
future Court action); Craig B. Paynter, Container Legislation - Equal Protection - Commerce Clause:
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Company Recent Case, 15 AKRON L. REV. 390, 390–391 (1981–1982)
(noting that the Supreme Court tends to avoid questions that implicate equal protection concerns).
227. As defined and explained in Part IV.B–C.
228. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013) (stating that where ICWA places
Indian children at a disadvantage in placement options “raises equal protection concerns”).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See Paynter, supra note 226, at 391(noting that the Supreme Court tends to avoid questions that
implicate equal protection concerns).
232. See 133 S. Ct. at 2565 (discussing the constitutional concerns of applying certain ICWA provisions
to children not in the custody of an Indian parent).
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down the EIFE, and instead endorsed it, if the EIFE facilitates keeping ICWA
constitutional as applied.
V. CONCLUSION
The Indian Child Welfare Act was passed during an era of nationwide
assimilation practices that were designed to separate Indian children from their
233
families with the intent to westernize them. Congress designed the statute to
preserve Indian families and tribes by limiting the ability of states to remove
234
Indian children from their homes. However, despite these laudable goals,
ICWA is an unconstitutional piece of legislation that violates the equal protection
235
rights of Indian children and impinges on state sovereignty over domestic
236
relations. The “existing Indian family” exception as adopted in Baby Boy L.
helps ameliorate the violation of Indian children’s rights to equal protection by
limiting ICWA provisions that place restrictions on involuntary parental
237
termination of rights.
The Court in Adoptive Couple recognized the need for the EIFE in this
limited way, and using language akin to that in in Baby Boy L., has revived the
238
EIFE. The Baby Boy L. and Adoptive Couple decisions are strikingly similar:
the facts are analogous, the issue of involuntary termination of parental rights is
the same, and the language used by both Courts to limit the application of ICWA
239
is nearly identical. It is therefore logical to conclude that, while the Court in
Adoptive Couple did not use the term “existing Indian family” exception,
Adoptive Couple endorses the EIFE, at least in those cases where a non-Indian
parent chooses a non-Indian adoption and the biological, Indian parent has never
had custody. Even sources denying that Adoptive Couple endorses the “existing
Indian family” exception acknowledge that the rationale in the case is similar to
240
that articulated in “existing Indian family” exception cases. Those denying that
the Supreme Court adopted the EIFE rely on the fact that the exception, as
articulated in Adoptive Couple, does not act as a complete bar to application of

233. Ellen Herman, Indian Adoption Project, ADOPTION HIST. PROJECT (Feb. 24, 2012), http://pages.
uoregon.edu/adoption/topics/IAP.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
234. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2004) (“The Congress herby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to protect
the best interests of Indian children and promote the stability and security of Indian tribes.”) (emphasis added).
235. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565 (noting equal protection concerns when applying ICWA in
a manner contrary to a child’s best interest).
236. See In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 528 (App. 4th Dist. 1996) (“Jurisdiction over matters of
family relations is traditionally reserved to the states.”).
237. See supra Parts II.D. and IV.E.
238. See supra Part IV.
239. See supra Part IV.
240. See GUIDE TO ADOPTIVE COUPLE, supra note 85, at 7 (claiming Adoptive Couple does not endorse the
“existing Indian family” exception).
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ICWA. But as discussed earlier, the EIFE can still exempt application of
specific portions of ICWA without implicating the need to address any other
242
portion. Thus, in light of the questionable constitutionality of ICWA, and the
recent holding in Adoptive Couple, state courts should reevaluate their rejection
of the “existing Indian family” exception and apply it where failing to do so
would result in a violation of Fourteenth Amendment.

241. Id.
242. See supra Part IV.B.
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